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Abstract
This paper starts from the fact that, when knowledge is used as input, tech-
nology generally exhibits increasing returns to scale. We consider an equi-
librium where patents are given to the new ideas, which are public goods,
rather than to the intermediate goods in which they are embodied as in the
standard literature. In order to avoid the problem of existence of a com-
petitive equilibrium, we assume that there is imperfect competition in all
the economic sectors that use knowledge. The methodology is illustrated in
growth models with an expanding variety of products.
1 Introduction
Most economists agree with the fact that one of the main factors of long
term growth is the continuous accumulation of knowledge. For instance, in
the standard growth models, this accumulation takes the form of an increase
in the number of intermediate goods (Romer (1990), Grossman-Helpman
(1991)), or in their quality (Aghion-Howitt (1992)). One of the main diffi-
culties to understand how the research activity is financed comes from the
basic public good nature of this knowledge. This raises essentially two types
of problems.
The first ones are standard in the public goods theory : they are linked to
the fact that these goods are non rival (or non depletable : see Mas-Collell-
Whinston-Green (1995)) and, in some cases, non excludable. Let us consider
for instance an innovation that takes the form of a scientific report that
describes the theory underlying the building and functionning of a new type
of engin that can be used for cars, airplanes, boats, and other types of goods.
Suppose that the inventor has a patent that protects its monopoly. Assume
now that this inventor is able to use a first-degree price discrimination, that
is to say to extract from each user its willingness to pay for the innovation. In
this case, the personalized prices paid to the inventor are exactly the Lindahl
prices : we know that they optimally finance research. There are at least two
reasons that explain why this type of discrimination is unlikely to happen in
practice. First, it requires that the inventor have the ability to exclude any
potential user, and thus to verify whether the innovation is used. Second, it
requires complete information about individual willingnesses to pay.
The second type of problems comes from the fact that knowledge is used
as an input in production processes, which implies non convex technologies.
It is worthwhile to note that this property has been pointed out prior to the
development of endogenous growth theory. For instance, Manning-Markusen-
Mc Millan (1985, p. 236) write that “With public intermediate goods there
is a presumption that the production functions of the consumption-goods in-
dustries exhibit increasing returns to scale”. More recently, several authors
recall that non rivalry of knowledge implies increasing returns to scale. For
instance, Jones (2001, p. 6) writes that “ . . . economists have recognized that
the non rivalry of knowledge implies that aggregate production is character-
ized by increasing returns to scale.” The main consequence of this property is
that if firms pay to use knowledge, for instance if they pay the Lindahl prices
(or less than these prices), and if they operate in competitive markets, their
profits are negative. For instance, Feehan (1989, p. 239) writes : “Constant
returns to scale in the primary factors means that placing user charges on
firms, e.g., Lindahl prices, is infeasible. By Euler’s theorem, payment to the
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private factors fully exhaust revenue so firms are unable to pay user charges.”
Similarly, in the abstract of his paper, Romer (1990) claims that “Because of
the non convexity introduced by a non rival good, price taking competition
cannot be supported.”
Given this fundamental problem existence of competitive equilibrium ,
different types of equilibria can be considered. The first one is a benchmark.
It can be assumed that all markets are competitive and that the firms which
use knowledge are subsidized to avoid negative profits. In this case, we
know from the first theorem of welfare economics that if the prices paid for
knowledge are the Lindhal prices, the first best optimum is implemented.
This equilibrium is interesting from a theoretical point of view because it
allows to characterize the optimal prices in a complete market framework.
However it is not realistic, in particular because it assumes that all of the
research is publicly financed.
The second type of equilibrium is the one exhibited in the standard lit-
erature starting with the seminal works of Romer, Grossman-Helpman and
Aghion-Howitt. To each innovation is associated one particular intermedi-
ate good, and the patent given to the producer of this good allows him to
benefit from monopoly profits. Let us return to the previous example of a
new type of engin. The standard growth theory assumes that the inventor
embodies his innovation in a new engin and that he monopolistically sells
this engin to firms which produce cars, airplanes, boats, and other machines.
Note that this equilibrium has incomplete markets. Indeed, knowledge is not
directly priced, and each innovation is indirectly financed by the profits on
the private intermediate good in which it is embodied. This explains why
this type of equilibrium is not generally optimal. Moreover, since knowledge
is not priced, it is possible to maintain the assumption of perfect competition
in all markets, except in those of the intermediate goods. In the previous
example, the firms which produce cars, airplanes, boats, etc, do not directly
pay knowledge, their markets are competitive, but they buy engins from a
monopolist.
The main objective of this paper is to study a third type of equilibrium
in which knowledge is directly and privately financed. To avoid the existence
problem due to the non convexity of technologies, we assume that there is
imperfect competition in all markets where knowledge is used as an input. In
contrast with the equilibria considered in the standard literature, the equi-
librium studied here has complete markets since knowledge is now directly
priced. For instance, in the previous example, we now assume that the inven-
tor of the new theory is directly rewarded by the firms that use it to produce
engins : the patent concerns the scientific report which is an indivisible pub-
lic good, and not the engin which is a divisible and private one. Thus, since
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the sectors of cars, airplanes, boats, etc, directly pay knowledge, we need to
assume that they are imperfectly competitive.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a very simple
growth model in which the main features of the analysis are presented. In
the next two sections, we use the methodology to construct equilibria with
complete markets and imperfect competition in two models considered in the
literature. In section 3, we consider the Isaac Newton model of Jones (2001)
and in section 4 the basic model of Romer (1990).
2 A simple model without intermediate goods
2.1 The model
There are three types of goods in the economy : a final good (Y ), labor (L),
and innovations (n). There are two sectors : the final good sector and the
research sector.
An innovation is an indivisible, public, and infinitely durable good, si-
multaneously used by the research sector and by the final good 1. Formally,
it is a point j on the segment [0, nt], where nt is the measure of the space of
innovations at time t. Innovations are produced by H firms. Each firm h has
a production function
n˙ht = q
h(Lht , nt), h = 1, . . . , H, (1)
where Lht is the quantity of labor used at time t. The total flow of innovations
produced at t in the whole economy is
n˙t =
∑
h
n˙ht =
∑
h
qh(nt, L
h
t ). (2)
Once invented, an innovation can be reproduced at zero cost. The final
good is produced by I firms, according to
Y it = F
i(Lit, nt), i = 1, . . . , I, (3)
where Lit is the labor used at t.
There is a continuous mass L of identical individuals. Each individual
is endowed with one unit of flow of labor, and his utility is
∫∞
0
u(ct)e
−ρtdt,
1Basically, one thinks of a report in which is explained a new theory, a new methodology
. . . as for instance a new type of engin in the above introduction.
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where ct is his consumption. In this model, the whole final good is used for
consumption : Lct =
∑
i Y
i
t = Yt. Finally, we have
LYt + L
R
t = L, (4)
where LYt =
I∑
i=1
Lit and L
R
t =
H∑
h=1
Lht .
Along this section, we use the following specification : n˙ht = q
h(Lht , nt) =
δntL
h
t , δ > 0, that implies n˙t = δntL
R
t ;Y
i
t = F
i(Lit, nt) = AL
i
tn
β
t , A > 0, β >
0, that implies Yt = AL
Y
t n
β
t ;u(ct) = c
1−ε
t /(1 − ε), ε > 0. Note that the two
technologies have constant-returns-to-scale with respect to labor, that is the
only private input in this model. Thus there are increasing returns with
respect to the two types of inputs : labor and knowledge 2.
2.2 The first best
In this sub-section, we consider an equilibrium in which all markets (final
output, labor and financial market) are perfectly competitive, and where in-
novations are financed by Lindahl prices. Since we assume constant-returns-
to-scale with respect to labor in the two sectors, final output and research,
all profits are nil in these sectors once labor is paid. Therefore we have to
assume that the Lindahl prices which are used to pay knowledge, and thus
to finance research, are subsidized by the government.
The price of good Y is normalized to one, and we denote by wt and rt the
wage and the interest rate. We denote by vit and v
h
t the Lindahl prices of one
innovation corresponding to the firms i(i = 1, . . . , I) and h(h = 1, . . . , H).
At each time t, the value of an innovation is
Vt =
∫ ∞
t
vse
− ∫ st rududs, (5)
where vs =
∑
i v
i
s +
∑
h v
h
s is the sum of the Lindahl prices paid at s for this
innovation. We assume that, once one innovation has occured, these Lindahl
prices are paid to the inventor from the date of invention to infinity.
In the final good sector, each competitive firm i maximizes its profit
piit = F
i(Lit, nt)− wtLit. The first-order condition is
F iL − wt = 0. (6)
2It could be possible to study a more general model with physical capital. Each in-
dividual production function would be for instance Y it = A(K
i
t)
α(Lit)
1−αnβt . The main
results would not be modified.
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F iL is independent of i, and we note it FL. Moreover, (6) implies
w˙t
wt
=
F˙L
FL
. (7)
The Lindahl price corresponding to the firm i, that is to say the marginal
profitability of an innovation, is
vit =
∂piit
∂nt
= F in. (8)
In the research sector, the profit of the firm h on innovations produced at t
is piht = q
h(Lht , nt)Vt − wtLht 3. Maximizing with respect to Lht leads to
qhLVt − wt = 0. (9)
qhL is independent of h, and we note it qL. Moreover, (9) implies
w˙t
wt
=
q˙L
qL
+
V˙t
Vt
. (10)
The Lindahl price corresponding to the firm h is
vht =
∂piht
∂nt
= qhnVt. (11)
We assume that the government finance the Lindahl prices by using a lump-
sum tax Tt paid by the households, such that its budget constraint is Tt =
ntvt.
Finally, the representative household maximizes his utility, that leads to
the standard condition :
ρ− u
′′
c˙t
u′
= rt. (12)
We are now able to give a condition which, after eliminating the prices,
characterizes any equilibrium path. Differentiating (5) with respect to t gives
rt = V˙t/Vt+vt/Vt. From (7) and (10), one gets V˙t/Vt = F˙L/FL− q˙L/qL. From
(6) and (9), one gets Vt = FL/qL. From (8) and (11), we obtain the total
Lindahl prices paid at t for one innovation : vt =
∑
i F
i
n + (FL/qL)
∑
h q
h
n.
Finally, using (12) we obtain the following basic condition :
ρ− u
′′
c˙
u′
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
qL
FL
(∑
i
F in +
FL
qL
∑
h
qhn
)
(13)
3The methodology used here allows to shorten the calculations. A more complete
analysis consists in maximizing
∫∞
0
(vtnht −wtLht )e−
∫ t
0 rududt, subject to n˙ht = q
h(Lht , nt).
It leads to the same results : see appendix A.1.
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This condition is close to the Ramsey-Keynes one, ρ − u′′ c˙/u′ = FK ,
that is obtained in the standard neoclassical model where the technology is
Y = F (K,L). But, here, the right side is the marginal productivity of Y if
this good is indirectly invested in the research sector in order to accumulate
knowledge.
Let us now use the specification given in sub-section 2.1 above. Then
we have u
′′
c˙/u′ = −εgY (gY is the rate of growth of Y ), F iL = Anβ, F in =
βALinβ−1, qhL = δn, and q
h
n = δL
h. (13) becomes
ρ + εgY = βgn − gn + δn
Anβ
(
βALY nβ−1 +
Anβ
δn
δLR
)
.
Since Y = ALY nβ, we have gY = βgn. Using the fact that L
Y +LR = L and
δLR = gn, one gets the rate of growth of the final output :
gY =
δβL− ρ
ε
. (14)
Then, it is easy to obtain the rates of growth, quantities and prices
at equilibrium. We have gn = (δL − ρ/β)/ε, LR = (L − ρ/δβ)/ε, LY =
(L(ε− 1) + ρ/δβ)/ε, V = Anβ−1/δ, vY = ∑i vi = βALY nβ−1, vR = ∑h vh =
ALRnβ−1, v = vY + vR = Anβ−1(βLY + LR). It can be noted that these re-
sults, in particular the total Lindahl prices (vY and vR), do not depend on
the number of firms (I and H) in the two sectors, final good and research.
Remark : it is easy to verify that this equilibrium is optimal. Indeed, the
social planner maximizes the utility
∫∞
0
u(ct)e
−ρtdt subject to the constraints∑
i F
i(Lit, nt) − Lct = 0, n˙t −
∑
h q
h(Lht , nt) = 0, and
∑
i L
i
t +
∑
h L
h
t − L =
0. This maximization leads to the condition (13) above and all the results
obtained at equilibrium : see appendix A-2. In fact, since all markets are
competitive and innovations are financed by Lindahl prices, this result of
optimality is a direct consequence of the first welfare theorem.
2.3 Partial financing of research
In the previous sub-section we have assumed that, at each time t, each inno-
vator receives a payment equal to the sum of the willingnesses to pay of all
users of his innovation. As it is explained in the introduction, this case can be
interpreted as a benchmark in which a patent is given to each innovation, each
innovator being able to use a first-degree price discrimination, that is to say
to extract from each user its willingness to pay (recall that, for the moment,
these payments are subsidized by the government). Now we assume that for
6
any reason (information problems, difficulty to exclude), only a part of the
Lindahl prices can be extracted. More precisely, we assume that the payment
for one innovation, vt = v
Y
t + v
R
t , is such that v
Y
t = η
∑
i v
i
t = η
∑
i F
i
n and
vRt = θ
∑
h v
h
t = θ(FL/qL)
∑
h q
h
n, with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Then, the
basic condition (13) above becomes
ρ− u
′′
c˙
u′
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙n
qn
+
qL
FL
(
η
∑
i
F in + θ
FL
qL
∑
h
qhn
)
.
Using the same particular specification, one gets the new rate of growth under
imperfect discrimination :
gY =
ηδβL− ρ
ε + η − 1 + (1− θ)/β . (15)
It is easy to see that ∂gY /∂θ is positive. Moreover, ∂gY /∂η has the same sign
than δL(1−θ)+(δβL(ε−1)+ρ), which is also positive : indeed, δβL(ε−1)+ρ
is positive because LY = (L(ε − 1) + ρ/δβ)/ε is positive. In others words,
according to the first intuition, this result shows that a partial financing of
research leads to an insufficient growth.
2.4 Private financing of research and imperfect com-
petition
We have already observed that the equilibrium studied above is only a bench-
mark. Clearly it is not realistic, essentially because it is assumed that the
whole research sector is financed by the government. Our objective now is
to construct an equilibrium in which the research activity is totally privately
financed. As explained above, on account of the reasonable assumption of
increasing returns to scale in the final sector and in the research sector, we
cannot continue to assume that these two markets are perfectly competitive.
On the contrary, in order to have non negative profits in these sectors, we as-
sume here that there is imperfect competition. More precisely, using directly
the specified model, we make the following hypothesis.
First, we assume that the (imperfect) competition in the final sector and
in the research sector leads to nil profits for all firms in these sectors :
piit = AL
i
tn
β
t − wtLit − vitnt = 0, i = 1, . . . , I (16)
and piht = δL
h
t ntVt − wtLht − vht nt = 0, h = 1, . . . , H (17)
Second, we assume that, in these sectors, all firms are price takers on the
markets of labor and of innovations. Then, if each firm minimizes its cost,
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one gets
vit
wt
=
βLit
nt
, i = 1, . . . , I (18)
and
vht
wt
=
Lht
nt
, h = 1, . . . , H (19)
Observe that we assume that a given firm i (or h) pays all the innovations
it uses (in number nt) at the same price v
i
t (or v
h
t ). We think that this
assumption can be justified by the symmetry of innovations in this model.
However, we allow that two different firms pay different prices ; in others
words, there is a possible price discrimination between firms. If it was not
the case, firms would have incentives to cluster in order to reduce the total
payment for knowledge.
Our main objective now is to calculate the growth rate of the output,
and then all the variables of the model. As in the first best equilibrium, we
always have
rt = ρ + εgY =
V˙t
Vt
+
vt
Vt
, (20)
where Vt is given by (5).
Using (16) and (18), we obtain ALitn
β
t − wtLit(1 + β) = 0, that gives
wt =
Anβt
1 + β
. (21)
In the same way, using (17) and (19), we have δLht ntVt− 2wtLht = 0, that
gives
wt =
δntVt
2
. (22)
Note that, for a given level of knowledge nt, imperfect competition leads
to a decrease in wt. Indeed, in the perfect competition case, we have wt = An
β
t
in the final sector (see (6)) and wt = δntVt in the research sector (see (9)).
That is why it is now possible to have non negative profits.
From (21) and (22), we obtain the value of an innovation at t :
Vt =
2A
δ(1 + β)
nβ−1t , (23)
that implies V˙t/Vt = (β − 1)gn.
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From (18) and (22), we get vit = δβVtL
i
t/2 (the more a firm is large,
the more it pays for one innovation), that gives the total payment for one
innovation by the final sector : vYt = δβVtL
Y
t /2.
Similarly, from (19) and (22), one gets vht = δVtL
h
t /2, that gives the
payment by the research sector : vRt = δVtL
R
t /2. Then we obtain the total
payment for one innovation
vt = v
Y
t + v
R
t =
δ(βLYt + L
R
t )Vt
2
. (24)
Finally, (20) can be written
ρ + εgY = (β − 1)gn + δ(βL
Y + LR)
2
.
Since gY = βgn, L
Y = L−LR, and δLR = gn, we obtain the following growth
rate
gY =
δβL/2− ρ
ε + (1− β)/2β , (25)
that can be put closer the first best one given by (14). Using (25), all the other
variables (growth rates, quantities, prices) can be calculated as previously in
2.2.
It would be rather long to give a complete comparison between the two
rates of growth given by (25) (imperfect competition) and (14) (first best op-
timum). In fact, according to the values of parameters, imperfect competition
can increase or decrease the rate of return in research given by V˙t/Vt + vt/Vt.
However, we can observe that if β = 1 (the marginal productivity of knowl-
edge in the final sector is constant), imperfect competition depresses growth.
This example shows that it is possible to simply calculate the rates of
growth, quantities and prices, in an equilibrium where innovations, which are
public goods, are directly and privately financed. This equilibrium is very
different from the standard one studied in the literature since Romer and
Grossman-Helpman, where innovations are indirectly financed by the profits
on the intermediate goods in which they are embodied. Here markets are
complete, but the imperfect competition which prevails in the sectors which
use knowledge as input (final sector and research) leads to a non-optimal
equilibrium.
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3 Imperfect competition in the Jones’ Isaac
Newton growth model
The purpose of sections 3 and 4 is to show how our methodology can be used
to construct equilibria with imperfect competition in other models. The first
one is the Isaac Newton model studied by Jones (2001). As in section 2, it
is a model without intermediate goods, but it is a semi-endogenous growth
model 4. We use the same notations as in section 2. The technology of the
final good sector is
Yt = n
σ
t L
Y
t , σ > 0. (26)
As previously, it can be desagregated in I firms : Y it = n
σ
t L
i
t, i = 1, . . . , I. In
the research sector, the technology is
n˙t = δL
R
t , δ > 0. (27)
Here also, it can be desagregated : n˙ht = δL
h
t , h = 1, . . . , H. We always have
LYt + L
R
t = Lt (see (4)), but now the population grows at constant rate :
L˙t
Lt
= ν. (28)
Jones assumes that a constant fraction s of the labor force works as re-
searchers, so that LRt = sLt and L
Y
t = (1 − s)Lt. Then he characterizes the
steady state growth path. He obtains gy = σν, where yt = Yt/Lt, L
R
t /nt =
ν/δ, LYt /nt = (1−s)ν/sδ, and Lt/nt = ν/sδ. Here we consider the same model
than Jones, given by (26)-(27)-(28), but without the assumption LRt = sLt.
As in more standard presentations (see for instance Barro-Sala-I-Martin
(1995)), we assume that there are M households, and that the utility per
household is ∫ ∞
0
u(ct)
M
e(ν−ρ)tdt, (29)
where u(ct) = (c
1−ε
t )/(1 − ε) and ct = Yt/Lt is the individual consumption.
This assumption allows to make a welfare analysis and to construct other
types of equilibria.
4In the same paper, Jones studies a more complete model where the population growth
rate is endogenous. The same methodology could be applied to this model.
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3.1 The first best
In any steady state we have, as Jones, gLR = gLY = gL = ν. From (26),
one gets gY = σgn + gLY , that gives gy = σgn. From (27), one gets also
gn = gLR = ν, and thus gy = σν. Finally, since gn = δL
R
t /n, one obtains
LRt /nt = ν/δ. The problem is to determine the ratios L
Y
t /nt and Lt/nt which,
in the Jones paper, depend on s.
As in 2.2 above, we first consider an equilibrium in which all markets
are competitive, and where innovations are financed by the government at
Lindahl prices levels. Note that, in this model, innovations are only used by
the final good sector (see (26)). As previously, we denote by vit the Lindahl
price corresponding to the firm i. Thus, at each time t, the value of an
innovation is Vt =
∫∞
t
vse
− ∫ st rududs, where vs = ∑Ii=1 vis (see (5)). In the
final sector, each firm i has a profit piit = n
σ
t L
i
t − wtLit, that gives the wage
level
wt = n
σ
t , (30)
and the Lindahl price
vit =
∂piit
∂nt
= σnσ−1t L
i
t. (31)
From (31), one gets vt = σn
σ−1
t L
Y
t , which is here also independent of the
number of firms in this sector.
In the research sector, the profit on innovations at t of the firm h is
piht = δL
h
t Vt − wtLht , that gives
wt = δVt. (32)
Finally, the household behavior leads to the standard condition : c˙t/ct =
(rt − ρ)/ε.
From (30) and (32), one gets gw = σgn = gV = σν. Moreover, since
vt = σn
σ−1
t L
Y
t and Vt = wt/δ = n
σ
t /δ, one gets vt/Vt = δσL
Y
t /nt. Finally,
the standard condition ρ+ εgc = V˙t/Vt + vt/Vt (see (20)) becomes ρ+ εσν =
σν + δσLYt /nt, that gives
LYt
nt
=
ρ + σν(ε− 1)
δσ
(33)
and
Lt
nt
=
ρ + σνε
δσ
(34)
It is easy to verify that the social planner program leads also to (33) and
(34). As previously, this result is a direct consequence of the first welfare
theorem (see Appendix B).
11
3.2 Imperfect competition
Now we study an equilibrium without government. Thus the production of
knowledge is directly and privately financed by the firms of the final sector,
which are in this model the only ones using it. As in 2.4, we assume that the
imperfect competition in this sector leads to two conditions. The first one
says that all profits (including now the payment of innovations) are nil :
piit = n
σ
t L
i
t − wtLit − vitnt = 0, i = 1, . . . , I. (35)
Second, the prices ratio is equal to the corresponding rate of substitution :
vit
wt
=
σLit
nt
, i = 1, . . . , I. (36)
As in 3.1, we have wt = δVt (see (32)) in the research sector and gc = (rt−ρ)/ε
from the household behavior.
Combining (35) and (36), and eliminating Lit, gives wt = n
σ
t /(1 + σ). Using
this result and (32), one gets gw = gV = σgn = σν. Moreover, we have Vt =
nσt /δ(1+σ). From (36), one gets vt =
∑
i v
i
t = wtσL
Y
t = σn
σ−1
t L
Y
t /(1+σ), and
thus vt/Vt = δσL
Y
t /nt. Finally, the standard condition ρ+εgc = V˙t/Vt+vt/Vt
becomes ρ+ εgc = σν + δσL
Y
t /nt, that gives the results obtained before (see
(33) and (34)) :
LYt
nt
=
ρ + σν(ε− 1)
δσ
and
Lt
nt
=
ρ + σνε
δσ
.
In this model, introducing imperfect competition in the final good sector
to directly finance research does not fundamentally modify the equilibrium.
More precisely, the quantities of goods and the rates of growth are unchanged,
but the repartition of the output is modified.
First we can observe that the rate of return in research, V˙t/Vt + vt/Vt,
is unchanged, that explains why the growth rate is unchanged. Indeed, in
the two equilibria we have gV = σν. In the first best equilibrium, we have
vt = σn
σ−1
t L
Y
t and Vt = n
σ
t /δ. In the imperfect competition equilibrium case,
we have obtained vt = σn
σ−1
t L
Y
t /(1 + σ) and Vt = n
σ
t /δ(1 + σ) : imperfect
competition depresses simultaneously the instantaneous payment for any in-
novation (vt) and its value (Vt). However, the ratio of these two prices is
unchanged, that explains why the rate of return in research is not modified.
The main differences between the two equilibria concern the repartition
of the output. This can be seen by looking at the budget constraint of the
households.
Let us consider the first best equilibrium. At each time t, the value of the
firms in the research sector, that is to say the value of the bonds (B) on the
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financial market, is Bt = ntVt = n
σ+1
t /δ : it is the value of knowledge, which
is the only one asset in this economy. The interests paid by the research
sector to the households are rtBt = (ρ + εσν)n
σ+1
t /δ. The new bonds issued
at t are B˙t = (σ + 1)n
σ
t n˙t/δ = (σ + 1)νn
σ+1
t /δ.
Finally, at time t, the households receive the wages wtLt = (ρ+εσν)n
σ+1
t /δσ,
and the interests on bonds rtBt = (ρ + εσν)n
σ+1
t /δ. They pay the taxes
Tt = vtnt = (ρ+σν(ε−1))nσ+1t /δ, they consume Ct = (ρ+σν(ε−1))nσ+1t /δσ,
and they buy the new bonds B˙t = (σ + 1)νn
σ+1
t /δ.
Let us now consider the imperfect competition equilibrium. In this case,
there is no tax, since knowledge is privately financed. Moreover, the level
of consumption is unchanged. Finally, the preceding levels of wages (wtLt)
interest on bonds (rtBt), and borrowings (B˙t), are divided by (1+σ).It can be
easily verified that the algebric variation of these terms, ∆(wtLt + rtBt− B˙t)
is exactly equal to the taxe Tt of the first best equilibrium.
4 Complete markets and imperfect competi-
tion in the Romer’s model
Our objective now is to use our methodology in the basic Romer’s model. The
main difference with the two preceding models is the presence of intermediate
goods. As it is well known, in the standard literature these goods are sold
by monopolies, that allows to indirectly finance research. In this type of
equilibrium, knowledge is not directly priced, and this incompleteness of
markets explains the presence of externalities (see for instance Barro-Sala-
I-Martin (1995) and Aghion-Howitt (1998)). As in sections 2 and 3, we
consider now an equilibrium with complete markets, that is to say in which
knowledge and intermediate goods are separately priced.
We keep the same notations as in the two previous sections and, in par-
ticular, [0, nt] is the set of innovations. But we assume now that at each
innovation j in [0, nt] is associated with one intermediate good, denoted also
by j. However, these two goods are very different : an innovation is an in-
divisible, public, and infinitely durable good (see 2.1), when each associate
private good is divisible and private 5.
The final good is produced along with Yt = A(L
Y
t )
α
∫ nt
0
xt(j)
1−αdj, which
can be desagregated in I firms : Y it = A(L
i
t)
α
∫ nt
0
xit(j)
1−αdj, i = 1, . . . , I.
The aggregated technology of research is n˙t = δntL
R
t , and it can be also
5Remember for instance the example of the introduction where the innovation is the
new theory described in the scientific report, and the intermediate good the engin in which
this theory is used.
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desagregated as follows : n˙ht = δntL
h
t , h = 1, . . . , H. The technology of pro-
duction of intermediate goods is linear : xt(j) = yt(j)/a, j ∈ [0, n]. A possible
simple desagregation is xk(j) = yk(j)/a, j ∈ [0, nt], k = 1, . . . , K. Finally, the
representative household utility is
∫∞
0
((ct)
1−ε/(1− ε))e−ρtdt, ε > 0.
In this section, we directly study the case of imperfect competition (see
Appendix C for the first best case).
The research sector behavior has already been studied in sub-section 2.4.
Starting from piht = δL
h
t ntVt−wtLht − vht nt = 0 (see (17)) and vht /wt = Lht /nt
(see (19)), one gets
Vt =
2wt
δnt
(37)
and vRt =
∑
h
vht =
δVtL
R
t
2
(38)
In the intermediate goods sector, the marginal profitability of an innovation
is nil. Indeed, if a firm k does not produce, its profit is nil. If it uses an
innovation to produce a good, it it also nil. Then we have
pt(j) = pt = a, for all j. (39)
Consider now the final good sector. Observe that the symmetry of intermedi-
ate goods allows to have xit(j) = x
i
t for all j, and thus
∑
i x
i
t(j) =
∑
i x
i
t = xt
for all j.
The first condition, saying that all profits are nil, is here
piit = A(L
i
t)
α
∫ nt
0
xit(j)
1−αdj − wtLit − ptntxit − vitnt = 0, i = 1, . . . , I.
The marginal profitability of an innovation for the firm i is ∂Y it /∂nt−ptxit =
A(Lit)
α(xit)
1−α − ptxit : the second term of the difference comes from the
fact that in order to benefit by an innovation, the firm i is obliged to buy
the intermediate good in which it is embodied. Similarly, we have also
∂Y it /∂L
i
t = αA(L
i
t)
α−1nt(xit)
1−α, and ∂Y it /∂x
i
t(j) = (1 − α)A(Lit)α(xit)−α.
Now we can write the conditions saying that the prices ratios are equal to
the corresponding marginal rates of substitution.
The first condition is pt
wt
=
∂Y it /∂x
i
t(j)
∂Y it /∂L
i
t
=
(1−α)Lit
αntxit
. Since pt = a,
∑
i L
i
t = L
Y
t ,
and
∑
i x
i
t = xt, this condition becomes
(1− α)wtLYt = αantxt. (40)
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The second condition is
vit
wt
=
∂Y it /∂nt−ptxit
∂Y it /∂L
i
t
=
xit(L
Y
t /xt)
1−α
αAnt
(
A
(
LYt
xt
)α
− pt
)
.
Using (39) and (40), one gets vit =
axit
(1−α)A
(
A− a
(
xt
LYt
)α)
, that gives
vYt =
∑
i
vit =
axt
(1− α)A
(
A− a
(
xt
LYt
)α)
. (41)
To eliminate the term (xt/L
Y
t )
α in this expression, we write that
∑
i pi
i
t = 0.
We have A(LYt )
αntx
1−α
t − wtLYt − antxt − ntvYt = 0. Then, using (40), one
gets
vYt = xt
(
A
(
LYt
xt
)α
− a
1− α
)
. (42)
Now we use the two expressions of vYt , given by (41) and (42), that gives
a
(1− α)A
(
A− a
(
xt
LYt
)α)
= A
(
LYt
xt
)α
− a
1− α,
and, finally, the following second degree equation
1
A(1− α)
(
a
(
xt
LYt
)α)2
− 2
1− α
(
a
(
xt
LYt
)α)
+ A = 0,
where the two roots are a( xt
LYt
) = A(1+
−
√
α). In order to have vYt positive, we
keep the lower root, that gives (see (41) :
vYt =
axt
√
α
1− α . (43)
As usual, in order to calculate the rate of growth at steady state, we start
from rt = ρ+ g
IC
Y = V˙t/Vt + vt/Vt (g
IC
Y is the growth rate in this equilibrium
with imperfect competition).
From (37) and (40), we have V˙t/Vt = w˙t/wt − n˙t/nt = 0. (38) gives vRt /Vt =
δLR/2. From (43), (37) and (40), one gets vYt /Vt = δL
Y /2
√
α. Thus we have
ρ+ εgICY = δL
Y /2
√
α+ δLR/2. Since LY = L−LR and δLR = gICY , one gets
finally
gICY =
δL/2
√
α− ρ
ε + 1/
√
α−1
2
. (44)
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This result is different from the usual formula obtained in the standard
literature where research is indirectly financed by the profits on intermediate
goods, that is 6 :
gY =
δ(1− α)L− ρ
ε + 1− α .
It is also different from the first best one : gFBY = (δL − ρ)/ε. It can be
shown that gICY can be higher or lower than g
FB
Y . One gets (see appendix C) :
if α > 1/4, gICY < g
FB
Y .
if α < 1/4, two cases can occur :
gICY < g
FB
Y , if ε < ε˜,
gICY > g
FB
Y , if ε > ε˜,
where ε˜ = (1−
√
α)(δL−ρ)
δL(1−2√α) .
As in the model of section 2 (but unlike to the results obtained in the
Jones’s Isaac Newton semi-endogenous growth model), imperfect competition
can increase or decrease the rate of return in research, and thus the output
growth rate.
This section shows that even if we stay inside one of the more standard
models of the literature, the Romer’s one, it is possible to study an equilib-
rium with complete markets which is very different from the usual one. Then,
in order to choose between different equilibrium concepts, we have to answer
in particular the following question : how is new knowledge financed ?
A possible intuitive answer is the following. We know that patents are
given to ideas, which are public goods. Then we can consider two polar
cases. In the first one, the innovator is able to extract only a little part
of the willingnesses to pay of the potential users of his innovation : see for
instance sub-section 2.3 above. In this case, he does not sells the patent and
he monopolistically sells the good in which the innovation is embodied : the
standard equilibrium prevails and, in a sense, incompletness is endogenous.
We can conjecture that more important are the information problems, more
likely is the standard equilibrium. In the second case, the innovator is able to
extract a large part of the willingnesses to pay and this revenue is larger than
the potential profits on the intermediate goods : thus knowledge is directly
financed and the equilibrium with complete markets prevails.
6In this example, this growth rate is lower than the optimal one. However, as shown
by Benassy (1998), it suffices to modify the production function of the final sector to have
too much research at equilibrium.
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5 Conclusion
This paper shows how to construct equilibria with imperfect competition,
which are different from the standard ones generally used in growth models
with an expanding variety of products. In these models, markets are incom-
plete and patents are given to the intermediate goods in which innovations
are embodied. In the equilibrium studied in this paper, patents directly
protect knowledge, which is a public good.
A first concern of this analysis is to shed a new light on the question of re-
search financing, the difficulty of which comes from the public good nature of
knowledge. A second concern comes from the fact that growth theory is often
used in different fields of economic theory : see for instance Aghion-Howitt
(1998). One important problem of these studies concerns their technical diffi-
culties. They are due to the fact that new questions (unemployment, natural
resources, environment, agency problems, . . . ) are introduced within models
that are already in their initial form not very simple. The methodology pre-
sented in this paper seeks to simplify these basic growth models. The main
reason is that, since knowledge is directly priced, it is no longer necessary to
introduce intermediate goods.
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Appendix A : a simple model without inter-
mediate goods
1 The research sector
In sub-section 2., we have said that each firm h maximizes qh(Lht , nt)Vt −
wtL
h
t . Clearly, it is a shortened. A more standard presentation is to say
that the firm maximizes the sum of the present values of its current profits,∫∞
0
(vtn
h
t − wtLht )e−
∫ t
0 rududt, subject to the constraint n˙ht = q
h(Lht , nt). The
Hamiltonian of this problem is :
H = (vtn
h
t − wtLht )e−
∫ t
0 rududt + νtq
h(Lht , nt).
The conditions ∂H/∂Lht = 0 and ∂H/∂n
h
t = −ν˙t yield
−wte−
∫ t
0 rudu + νtq
h
L = 0 (A.1)
and
vte
− ∫ t0 rududt = −ν˙t. (A.2)
Integrating (A.2) between t and +∞ gives ∫∞
t
vse
− ∫ s0 rududs = νt. Indeed,
we have limt→∞ νt = 0 owing to the transversality condition, limt→∞ νtnht =
0, in which nht is bounded below (we can assume n
h
0 > 0, and n
h
t is not
decreasing).
Using this result, (A.1) can be written wte
− ∫ t0 rudu = qhL
∫∞
t
vse
− ∫ s0 rududs, and
thus wt = q
h
LVt, where Vt =
∫∞
t
vse
− ∫ st rududs is the value of an innovation at
t (see (5) above) : we obtain the condition (9) of the main text.
Differentiating the hamiltonian with respect to nt gives
∂H
∂nt
= νtq
h
n = q
h
n
∫ ∞
t
vse
− ∫ s0 rududs = qhnVte−
∫ t
0 rudu,
that can be written ∂H
∂nt
e
∫ t
0 rudu = qhnVt : we obtain the expression (11) of the
main text. Now, we have ∂H
∂nt
= vht e
− ∫ t0 rudu : it is the present value at t = 0
of the Lindahl price vht paid at t for an innovation.
2 Welfare
The social planner maximizes
∫∞
0
u(ct)e
−ρtdt subject to the constraints∑
i
F i(Lit, nt)− Lct = 0, n˙ht −
∑
h
qh(Lht , nt) = 0,
and
∑
i
Lit +
∑
h
Lht − L = 0.
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The current value hamiltonian is
H = u(c) + λ(
∑
i
F i(Li, n)− Lc) + µ(
∑
h
qh(Lh, n)) + ν(
∑
i
Li +
∑
h
Lh − L).
The first-order conditions, ∂H/∂c = 0, ∂H/∂Li = 0, and ∂H/∂Lh = 0 yield
u′(c)− λL = 0 (a), λF iL + ν = 0 (b) and µqhL + ν = 0 (c).
Differentiating (a) with respect to t gives λ˙/λ = u
′′
c˙/u′ (a’). From (b)
and (c), we have F iL = FL ∀i and qhL = qL ∀h. Differentiating the equality
λFL = µqL with respect to t gives −λ˙/λ = F˙L/FL − µ˙qL/λFL − q˙L/qL (b’).
The condition ∂H/∂n = ρµ− µ˙ gives λ∑i F in + µ∑h qhn = ρµ− µ˙ and thus
−µ˙/λ = ∑i F in + (qL/FL)(∑h qhn − ρ). Plugging this expression in (b’), and
using (a’), gives finally
ρ− u
′′
c˙
u′
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
qL
FL
(∑
i
F in +
FL
qL
∑
h
qhn
)
.
This condition is exactly the basic condition (13) obtained at equilibrium.
If we consider the particular specification of the main text, we get the results
already obtained at equilibrium, in particular the rate of growth given by
(14).
Appendix B : the Jones’ Isaac Newton model
Normalizing L0 to one, we have Lt = e
νt. Since Yt = n
σ
t L
Y
t , the per capita
consumption is ct = Yt/Lt = n
σ
t e
−νtLYt . Finally, we have n˙t = δL
R
t =
δ(Lt − LYt ) = δ(eνt − LYt ).
The social planner maximizes
∫∞
0
(u(ct)/M)e
(ν−ρ)tdt, subject to the con-
straints ct = n
σ
t e
−νtLYt , and n˙t = δ(e
νt−LYt ). The current value hamiltonian
is
H = (u(c)/M)e(ν−ρ)t + λ(nσe−νtLY − c) + µδ(eνt − LY ).
The first-order conditions ∂H/∂c = 0 and ∂H/∂LY = 0 yield :
(u′(c)/M)e(ν−ρ)t − λ = 0 (a)
and λnσe−νt − µδ = 0 (b).
Differentiating (a) with respect to time gives λ˙/λ = u
′′
c˙/u′ − ρ + ν (a’).
Similarly, differentiating (b) gives λ˙nσ +λσnσ−1n˙ = δµ˙eνt + δµνeνt (b’). The
condition ∂H/∂n = −µ˙ yields λσnσ−1e−νtLY = −µ˙ (c).
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Using (b) and (c), (b’) becomes λ˙nσ + λσnσ−1n˙ = −δλσnσ−1LY + λνnσ.
Finally, plugging (a’) in this last equation, one gets
LY
n
=
ρ + σν(ε− 1)
δσ
,
that is exactly the condition (33), obtained in an equilibrium where all mar-
kets are competitive and innovations are financed by the government at Lin-
dahl prices levels.
Appendix C : the Romer’s model
Using the notations of section 4, we know that the first best rate of growth
is gFBY = (δL − ρ)/ε, and that the rate of growth in an equilibrium with
patents on intermediate goods and knowledge non directly priced is gY =
(δ(1 − α)L − ρ)/(ε + 1 − α) : these results are standard. It suffices here
to verify that an equilibrium with complete markets, perfect competition
everywhere, and Lindahl prices to finance knowledge, leads to the first best.
As in section 4, we have by symmetry xit(j) = x
i
t and
∑
i x
i
t(j) = xt. In the
final good sector, the profit of firm i is
piit = A(L
i
t)
α
∫ nt
0
xit(j)
1−αdj − wtLit −
∫ nt
0
ptx
i
t(j)dj.
The first-order conditions, ∂piit/∂L
i
t = 0 and ∂pi
i
t/∂x
i
t(j) = 0, implies
αA(Lit)
α−1nt(xit)
1−α − wt = 0 and (1 − α)A(Lit)α(xit)−α − pt = 0, that
gives
αAnt
(
xt
LYt
)1−α
− wt = 0 (C.1)
and (1− α)A
(
LYt
xt
)1−α
− pt = 0 (C.2)
The willingness to pay for an innovation, that is to say the Lindahl price,
is vit = ∂pi
i
t/∂nt = A(L
i
t)
α(xit)
1−α − ptxit, that implies
vYt =
∑
i
vit = xt
(
A
(
LYt
xt
)α
− pt
)
. (C.3)
In the research sector, the profit of firm h is piht = δL
h
t ntVt − wtLht , where Vt
is given by (5). The maximization of piht gives
δntVt − wt = 0. (C.4)
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The Lindahl price corresponding to an innovation is vht = ∂pi
h
t /∂nt =
δLht Vt, that implies
vRt =
∑
h
vht = δL
R
t Vt. (C.5)
In the intermediate goods sector (which here is perfectly competitive),
the profit of firm k is pikt =
∫ nt
0
(pty
k
t (j)/a− ykt (j))dj. The constant returns to
scale assumption implies
pt = a. (C.6)
Moreover, the Lindahl price for an innovation is nil. Indeed, if a firm in this
sector does not use an innovation, it does not produce the corresponding in-
termediate goods : its profit on this innovation is nil. If it uses the innovation
to produce the good, the profit is also nil. That is why the Lindahl price is
nil : vkt = 0, for all k.
In order to study the steady state, we use as usual the condition rt =
ρ + gY = V˙t/Vt + vt/Vt, where vt = v
Y
t + v
R
t .
From (C.1), we have gw = gn. Thus, (C.4) gives V˙t/Vt = 0.
From (C.5), one gets vR/V = δLR.
From (C.2 and (C.6), one has (LY /x) = (a/(1 − α)A)1/α. Plugging this
result in (C.3) gives vY = aαx/(1 − α). Then, using (C.1) and (C.3), one
gets vY /V = δLY .
Finally, the initial condition becomes ρ + εgY = δL
Y + δLR. Since L =
LY + LR and δLR = gY , we obtain
gY =
δL− ρ
ε
, (C.7)
that is exactly the standard first best solution in this model.
Now we can compare the rate of growth obtained in an economy with
complete markets and imperfect competition (see gICY given by (44)) and the
first best one (gFBY given by (C.7)). One gets
gICY − gFBY =
δL/2
√
α− ρ
ε + 1/
√
α−1
2
− δL− ρ
ε
=
δLε
2
√
α
− ρε− δLε− δL
2
(
1√
α
− 1
)
+ ρε + ρ
2
(
1√
α
− 1
)
ε
(
ε + 1/
√
α−1
2
)
=
δL(ε− 2ε√α− 1 +√α) + ρ(1−√α)
ε(2ε
√
α + 1−√α)
=
δLε(1− 2√α) + (ρ− δL)(1−√α)
ε(2ε
√
α + 1−√α)
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The denominator of this expression is positive. Let us assume (δL − ρ)
positive, that is to say gFBY positive. Then, if α > 1/4, we have 1−2
√
α < 0,
and thus gICY < g
FB
Y if ε < ε˜, and g
IC
Y > g
FB
Y if ε > ε˜, where ε˜ =
(1−√α)(δL−ρ)
δL(1−2√α) .
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